Sheri Lyn Anderson, a/k/a Sheri Lynn Nielsen v. Lonnie R. Oman, Cloyd Goates, J. Gaylun Smith, Busch-Provo, A Utah Limited Partnership, d/b/a Centennial Apartmetns and Oman Corporation, a Utah Corporation, d/b/a Centennial Apartments : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Sheri Lyn Anderson, a/k/a Sheri Lynn Nielsen v.
Lonnie R. Oman, Cloyd Goates, J. Gaylun Smith,
Busch-Provo, A Utah Limited Partnership, d/b/a
Centennial Apartmetns and Oman Corporation, a
Utah Corporation, d/b/a Centennial Apartments :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ray M. Harding, Jr.; Harding & Associates; Attorney for Respondent.
Ray Phillips Ivie; Ivie & Young; Henry E. Heath; Strong & Hanni; Attorneys for Defendants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation









OURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHERI LYN ANDERSON, a/k/a 
SHERI LYNN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs 
LONNIE R. OMAN, CLOYD GOATES, 
J. GAYLUN SMITH, BUSCH-PROVO, 
A Utah Limited Partnership, 
d/b/a CENTENNIAL APARTMENTS 
and OMAN CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, d/b/a CENTENNIAL 
APARTMENTS, 
Defendants/Appellants 
Case No. 870392-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal From Judgment Entered Pursuant to a Jury Verdict 
Rendered in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
in and for Utah County, State of Utah, Before the Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin, JR., Judge Pro Tern 
Ray Phillips Ivie, #3657 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Henry E. Heath, $1441 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
HARDING Sc ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Argument priority classification: No, \*k!o 
DEC 171907 
COU j , f^i^lyl 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHERI LYN ANDERSON, a/k/a 
SHERI LYNN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIE R. OMAN, CLOYD GOATES, 
J. GAYLUN SMITH, BUSCH-PROVO, 
A Utah Limited Partnership, 
d/b/a CENTENNIAL APARTMENTS 
and OMAN CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, d/b/a CENTENNIAL 
APARTMENTS, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
Case No. 870392-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal From Judgment Entered Pursuant to a Jury Verdict 
Rendered in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
in and for Utah County, State of Utah, Before the Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin, JR., Judge Pro Tern 
Ray Phillips Ivie, #3657 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Henry E. Heath, $1441 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
HARDING Sc ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Argument priority classification: No. 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE STRICKEN 
PLAINTIFF'S EXEMPLARY DAMAGE TESTIMONY 
AND CLOSING ARGUMENT AND SHOULD HAVE 
ADMONISHED THE JURY TO DISREGARD THE 
SAME AND INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT IT 
COULD NOT AWARD EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 5 
A. The Trial Court Should Have Stricken 
Plaintiff's Testimony Asking for 
Exemplary Damages and Should Have 
Admonished the Jury to Disregard the 
Same 5 
B. The Court Should Have Stricken 
Plaintiff's Closing Argument Requesting 
Exemplary Damages and Should Have 




The Court Should Have Instructed the 
Jury That It Could Not Award 
Exemplary Damages 10 
POINT II. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED ON THE 
RECORD REGARDING IMPROPER CONTACT 
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE JURY . , 15 
POINT III. 
CONCLUSION 
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND APPEARS TO 
HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
PASSION OR PREJUDICE 19 
25 
-1-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983) 15 
Conrad v. Lakewood General Hospital, 
410 P.2d 785 (Wash. 1966) 10,11 
Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co., 289 F.2d 797 
(2nd Cir. 1961) 20 
Floyd v. Dodson, 692 P.2d 77 (Okl.App. 1984) 13 
Garrett v. Olsen, 691 P.2d 123 (Or.App. 1984) 11,12 
Gonzales v. General Motors Corp., 
553 P.2d 1281 (N.M. 1976) 20 
Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 
403 N.E.2d 402 (1980 Mass) 24 
Regenold v. Rutherford, 679 P.2d 833 
(N.M.App. 1984) 22,23 
State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, (1925) . . . 16,17 
State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1977) 16,17 
State v. Larocco, 64 Utah Adv.Rep. 49 (Utah 1987). . . . 16,18 
State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 
491 P.2d 1093 (1971) 14 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) 16,17,18 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Jury Instruction Forms For Utah 90.77 10 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 1 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103 1,24 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(d) 6 
12 A.L.R.4th 96, Section 1(e) 20 
6 Am.Jur. Trials 963 24 
Stein: Closing Argument 8 
-ii-
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to a Notice 
of Pour-Over entered by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
September 4, 1987. (R. 652). Jurisdiction was vested in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to a Notice of Appeal 
timely filed (R. 617, 618, and 624). The transfer of the case 
from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals is made 
pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Amendments to the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
This appeal is brought pursuant to certain provisions of 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 103 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Because of the length of these citations, 
they are set forth in Appendix A to this Brief. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying 
defendant/appellants1 Motion for A New Trial following the entry 
of judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff at a trial 
held in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and 
for Utah County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., Judge Pro Tern. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an incident which occurred on or 
about January 22, 1984 in Utah County, State of Utah at an 
apartment complex known as Centennial Apartments. At said time 
and place, plaintiff claims that she slipped and fell as a 
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consequence of certain negligent acts of defendants and its 
employees or agents causing personal injuries for which she sought 
a judgment for damages from defendants. (R. 1, 2, 3 and 4). At 
the time the plaintiff was a tenant of the apartment and 
defendants were owners of the same, (R. 1, and 7). Defendants 
have denied that they were liable for any injuries which plaintiff 
may have received. (R. 7, 8 and 9). 
A trial on the issues proceeded in the District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District before the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., Judge Pro Tern, sitting with a jury. The trial 
commenced on the 20th day of April, 1987 and concluded on the 24th 
day of April, 1987 at which time the jury entered a verdict in the 
amount of $150,000.00 in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants. Judgment was entered upon the verdict and defendants 
filed a Motion for a new trial which was denied by the court. 
Whereupon defendants filed timely notice of appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah which subsequently poured-over the case 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The following relevant facts are material to the issues 
raised by this appeal: 
1. During the course of the trial, plaintiff who was 
pregnant (R. 1452) at the time, suffered abdominal distress which 
was significant enough that she chose to absent herself from part 
of the trial. (R. 1396) . 
2. Prior to leaving, she was observed to be in distress 
and to go into the restroom with certain women jurors as reported 
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by the bailiff to the court. (R. 1454). 
3. The abdominal distress was significant enough that 
plaintiff was examined on a bench just outside the courtroom 
during the recess by a physician who was present to testify on 
behalf of plaintiff. (R. 1453, 1454). 
4. The bailiff reported the incident to the court and 
subsequently defendants made a Motion for a mistrial, upon which 
the court never ruled. (R. 1452 to 1454). 
5. There was no evidence which would justify a 
consideration of punitive damages and the matter was not submitted 
to the jury on the issue of punitive damages. (R. 365, 366). 
6. Plaintiff testified in response to questions from her 
counsel that she wanted justice and that she did not want the 
things that happened to her to happen to anyone else. (R. 914). 
7. Counsel for the defendants objected to this question, 
but the court refused to rule on the objection. (R. 914). 
8. During his closing argument, counsel for plaintiff 
asked the jury to award exemplary damages. (R. 1726 to 1728). 
9. Counsel for defendants requested that the court 
instruct the jury that it could not award punitive damages and 
took exception to the court's refusal to so instruct the jury. 
(R. 1054). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the court received information from the bailiff that 
the plaintiff was in abdominal distress and was seen going into 
the restroom with certain women jurors, the court had an 
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affirmative duty to inquire on the record of the circumstances in 
the restroom. The court should have determined whether any 
improper conversation or familiarity occurred at that time. 
The court should have stricken the testimony of the 
plaintiff requesting exemplary damages and admonished the jury to 
disregard the same. Further, the court should have stricken the 
closing argument of plaintiff's counsel wherein he requested 
exemplary damages and admonished the jury to disregard the same. 
The court should have given the cautionary instruction on 
damages requested by defendants. Each of these errors were 
prejudicial in that they affected the substantial right of the 
defendants to a fair trial and the court abused its discretion in 
not granting a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit 
prejudicial error in the following particulars: 
1. In failing to strike plaintiff's testimony requesting 
exemplary damages and in failing to admonish the jury to disregard 
the same? 
2. In failing to strike plaintiff's rebuttal argument 
requesting exemplary damages and in failing to admonish the jury 
to disregard the same? 
3. In failing to give defendants' requested cautionary 
instruction on damages? 
4. In failing to determine if misconduct had occurred 
between the plaintiff and jury by making the proper inquiry of the 
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plaintiff and certain members of the jury? 
5. In failing to find that the verdict of the jury was 
excessive in that it appears to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice or as a consequence of 
irregularities in the trial? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE STRICKEN 
PLAINTIFF'S EXEMPLARY DAMAGE TESTIMONY AND 
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND SHOULD HAVE ADMONISHED 
THE JURY TO DISREGARD THE SAME AND 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT IT COULD NOT AWARD 
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 
A, The Trial Court Should Have Stricken Plaintiff's 
Testimony Asking for Exemplary Damages and Should 
Have Admonished the Jury to Disregard the Same. 
Although plaintiff asked for punitive damages in her 
Second Amended Complaint (R. 206), plaintiff did not request 
punitive damages in her requested jury instructions. An 
examination of those instructions on damages requested by the 
plaintiff indicates no reference whatsoever to punitive damages. 
(R. 365, 366). 
At the conclusion of the direct examination of the 
plaintiff, her counsel asked her what she wanted from this case 
and she responded that she wanted justice and that she did not 
want the things that happened to her to happen to anyone else. 
(R. 914). When Mr. Ivie objected on behalf of defendants, 
plaintiff's attorney commenced the next question before the court 
ruled. The court interrupted Mr. Harding and stated, "Well, 
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there's nothing before the court to rule on." (R. 914). While 
the court may have been technically correct since plaintiff's 
answer was already in and since Mr. Ivie did not move to strike 
the same, nevertheless, the court had a duty in the interest of 
justice to strike the answer and admonish the jury to disregard it 
on the court's own volition. 
The attention of this court is directed to Appendix B 
which sets forth the numerous times the trial judge interjected 
himself into the proceedings during the direct examination by Mr. 
Harding of various witnesses during the plaintiff's case in chief. 
Appendix B indicates that of 14 3 pages out of approximately 466 
pages of direct examination by Mr. Harding during plaintiff's case 
in chief, the court on its own pointed out improper questions by 
counsel, struck testimony from the record and interrupted the 
examination by counsel to conduct its own examination of various 
witnesses. It should be noted that in each of these instances, 
the court acted completely on its own volition and without any 
solicitation (by way of objection or otherwise) on the part of 
defense counsel. This illustrates that the court not only 
recognized its duty to control the presentation of evidence, but 
actually inserted itself into the process to a significant degree, 
at least during the plaintiff's case in chief. 
Apparently the court was acting pursuant to the inherent 
power of the court to supervise the presentation of evidence in 
the interest of justice and to further the purposes of Rule 103(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence which is set forth in Appendix A. 
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This is sometimes known as the plain error rule and it recognizes 
the need for the court to take notice of plain errors which affect 
substantial rights even if they are not brought to the attention 
of the court. In the instant case, the trial judge repeatedly 
acted affirmatively to keep error out of the record before counsel 
had an opportunity or an inclination to enter an objection as 
illustrated by Appendix B. 
However, when the court was asked to rule on plaintiff's 
objectionable testimony regarding exemplary damages, the court 
refused to rule which was a clear abuse of the court's discretion 
in that it invited the jury to make an example out of the 
defendants even though the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive 
damages. 
B. The Court Should Have Stricken Plaintiff's Closing 
Argument Requesting Exemplary Damages and Should 
Have Admonished the Jury to Disregard the Same. 
During the rebuttal portion of his closing argument, Mr. 
Harding pleaded with the jury not only to compensate the plaintiff 
for her injuries, but also that they should send a message to 
other landlords. Plaintiff's counsel stated, "And you can show 
the defendants and all other landlords that just don't care, that 
this is an important case, an important matter." (Emphasis 
added). Mr. Harding then went on to argue that unless they fully 
compensated the plaintiff, they would not be sending a message to 
the defendants. However, if they did fully compensate the 
plaintiff, the message would go out to landlords that they could 
not let snow and ice accumulate during the winter so as to create 
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a hazardous condition- Mr. Harding closed his rebuttal argument 
by referring to the candles of justice in Utah County and then 
asked the jury to return a verdict for his client, "For the full 
amount of compensation, for the full amount of justice, in this 
case to do justice." Clearly, this is an argument asking for 
exemplary damages in addition to compensatory damages. (R. 1726 
to 1728) . 
It is true that Mr. Ivie did not object on the record to 
the offensive closing argument. There is authority for the 
proposition that counsel may wait until the closing argument is 
completed before objecting to the offensive portions thereof. In 
Stein: Closing Argument, §86 (1985), it states: 
Generally speaking, objections should be 
interposed at the time the harm is apparent. 
In such regard it has been recognized that 
the better practice is to object to argument 
at the time it is made. Counsel, however, 
should guard against being premature and 
should not object in the middle of an 
offensive sentence. There is authority to 
the effect that counsel may wait until the 
end of the argument and state his objections 
then. . . . 
The court should not be hesitant to admonish offending 
counsel during the course of closing argument. In fact, the court 
is in a better position to do it than opposing counsel. The 
attorney may be reluctant to advocate an objection during the 
course of closing argument for fear of disapproval by the trial 
judge and alienation of the jury. On the other hand, the court 
should have no such concerns and should guard against a 
miscarriage of justice by monitoring the closing argument so that 
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the jury can be admonished to disregard inappropriate comments 
immediately following the time they are made. This would have 
been consistent with the court's practice of monitoring Mr. 
Harding as demonstrated by Appendix B. 
It is also acknowledged that Mr. Ivie did not make a 
formal objection on the record to the closing argument after it 
was completed. Rather, he directed the court's attention to the 
offensive argument (R. 1054) and the court abused its discretion 
by failing to strike the offending language from the closing 
argument on the record, in front of the jury and admonishing the 
jury to disregard the same before it started to deliberate. 
It should be noted that the jury had not yet started to 
deliberate at the time the court's attention was directed to the 
improper closing argument. Following the conclusion of the 
closing argument, the court directed the bailif to escort the jury 
to the jury room but directed them not to start to deliberate 
until all of the exhibits were taken to the jury room and the door 
thereto was closed. (R. 1730). Thereupon, a long discussion 
between the court and counsel pertaining to other matters took 
place. It was during the course of this discussion that Mr. Ivie 
directed the court's attention to the offensive closing argument. 
(R. 1744). Following the same the court then stepped from the 
bench and assisted the clerk in taking exhibits to the jury room 
and although the record does not show exactly when the jury 
started to deliberate, it is reasonable to assume that it was not 
prior to this time. (R. 1744). 
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C. The Court Should Have Instructed the Jury That It 
Could Not Award Exemplary Damages. 
Defendants requested that the court give the cautionary 
instruction informing the jury that they were not to award any 
damages by way of punishment or to make an example out of the 
defendants. (R. 458). The court refused to give that instruction 
during deliberations in chambers prior to closing arguments. 
Following closing arguments, but before the jury started to 
deliberate, the defendant took exception to the court's failure to 
give said instruction. (R. 1744). 
The requested instruction is taken from Jury Instruction 
Forms For Utah (JIFU) 90.77 which reads as follows: 
Not To Award Punitive Damages 
In this case you may not include in any 
award to plaintiff any sum for the purpose 
of punishing the defendant, or to make an 
example of him for the public good or to 
prevent other accidents. Such damages would 
be punitive rather than compensatory, and 
the law does not authorize punitive damages 
in this action. 
The testimony of the plaintiff asking for examplary 
damages and the inappropriate closing argument by her counsel 
required the court to give this requested instruction and its 
failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. We have been unable 
to find any case law precedent that is identical to this case, but 
there are cases which, although distinguishable, support 
defendant's position with analogous reasoning. The Supreme Court 
of Washington considered the issue of the failure to give such an 
instruction in the case of Conrad v. Lakewood General Hospital, 
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410 P.2d 785 (Wash. 1966). Mrs. Conrad brought an action against 
the defendants for medical malpractice following gallbladder 
surgery and was awarded judgment of $12,500. There was no claim 
for punitive damages asserted in the action and the court refused 
to give a cautionary instruction similar to the one requested 
in the instant case. The court held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to give the instruction since the 
plaintiff did not ask for punitive damages or put on evidence in 
support of the same. Ic[. at 789. The logical inference is that 
had plaintiff asked for exemplary damages, the court would have 
been required to give the cautionary instruction advising the jury 
that it was not to award exemplary damages. This same reasoning 
should have been applied by the trial court in the instant case 
and it was prejudicial error not to give the cautionary 
instruction requested by the defendants. 
The Oregon Supreme Court considered a similar issue in 
the case of Garrett v. Olsen, 691 P.2d 123 (Or.App. 1984). The 
plaintiff was a school teacher who brought an action for battery 
against a student and his father. The plaintiff sought punitive 
damages which were awarded. Defendants appealed and assigned as 
one of the errors the court's failure to give a requested 
cautionary instruction on punitive damages which would have 
required the court to consider the conduct of the teacher as 
mitigation against punitive damages. The court held that the 
failure to give the instruction was an abuse of discretion and the 
matter was remanded for a retrial on the punitive damage issue. 
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The analogous reasoning to the instant case is that if 
the cautionary instruction was appropriate in Garrett where the 
matter of punitive damages was submitted to the jury, it is even 
more appropriate in this case where plaintiff asked for punitive 
damages inappropriately as set forth above. By not giving the 
requested instruction, there is no way of knowing if the jury 
properly understood that it could not award exemplary damages nor 
is there any way of knowing if the jury was influenced by 
prejudice and passion. 
The Garrett case is also instructive on another point. 
In that case plaintiff conceded that the instruction was correct 
but stated that the defendant failed to preserve the error for 
appeal. The court rejected that argument and stated that if the 
requested instruction was correct, and if it was requested on an 
issue on which the trial court failed to instruct, the claim of 
error was preserved. In the instant case, it may be argued that 
defendants failed to properly preserve their right to object to 
the testimony of the plaintiff on punitive damages and also to the 
closing argument of plaintiff*s counsel. This matter was 
discussed above and it is defendants1 position that not only 
should the court have ruled on its own volition, but the fact that 
defendants properly requested a cautionary instruction on punitive 
damages has preserved the matter for appeal. The court had ample 
opportunity to correct the error by giving the requested 
instruction and its failure to do so constituted prejudicial 
error. 
-12-
Floyd v. Dodson, 692 P.2d 77 (Okl.App. 1984), considered 
the effect of the court's failure to instruct on punitive damages 
in a case involving intentional infliction of emotional distress* 
Plaintiff had prayed for actual damages of approximately $5,000 
and punitive damages of $50,000. The trial court instructed the 
jury that it could not award more than $55,000 but refused to 
instruct the jury on the matter of punitive damages, apparently 
believing that punitive damages could not be awarded for this 
cause of action. (There is an interesting footnote to the 
decision in which the appellate court ponders the inconsistency of 
the trial judge in telling the jury that it could award $55,000 
and in refusing to instruct on punitive damages.) The appellate 
court held that the court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
punitive damages required that the matter be remanded for a new 
trial on the punitive damage issue. The court stated as follows: 
Herein, the plaintiff's proof clearly did 
not support an award of actual damages in 
the amount of $10,000. Plaintiff had, in 
fact, prayed for only $5,505 in actual 
damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. 
The jury, as is evidenced by the size of the 
award, however, clearly did seek to punish 
the defendant and award damages in excess of 
the claimed compensatory damages, even in 
the absence of an appropriate instruction. 
The trial court's refusal to instruct the 
jury on punitive damages was accordingly not 
only error but further necessitates our 
reversal of the case because it is now 
impossible to distinguish that portion of 
the jury's award which represents the amount 
of damages actually sustained by the 
plaintiff from that portion of the award 
which was meant to punish the defendant. 
Id. at 81. 
-13-
The rationale of the Oklahoma appellate court can be 
applied to the instant case. Whenever you have a party seeking 
punitive damages, the court has a duty to properly instruct the 
jury. If the issue of punitive damages is submitted to the jury, 
it must be properly instructed relative to the same. If not, the 
court should also instruct the jury by giving a cautionary 
instruction against awarding punitive damages. This is 
particularly true when plaintiff seeks punitive damages as in this 
case. The failure to properly instruct the jury on the matter of 
punitive damages leaves the jury to conjecture on what is 
appropriate and what is not. 
It is acknowledged that as a general rule the court has 
wide latitude in determining what instructions are given to the 
jury. Normally the refusal to give an instruction is not grounds 
for remand. However, when a jury is insufficiently advised or 
when it appears that a jury is misled, it is prejudicial error for 
a court not to give a requested instruction. In State v. 
Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093 (1971), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
A refusal to give an instruction cannot be 
the basis for reversal, unless the jury was 
insufficiently advised of the issue they 
were to determine or if it appears they were 
confused or mislead to the prejudice of the 
person complaining. (Emphasis added). 
Id. 491 P.2d at 1095. 
In Ouzounian, the court held that the jury was 
sufficiently advised and was not mislead by the testimony. 
However, in the instant case, the jury was mislead by the 
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testimony of the plaintiff and the closing argument of her 
attorney in which the plaintiff asked to make an example of the 
defendants. The instructions given by the court on damages were 
insufficient to advise the jury that exemplary damages were not 
part of compensatory damages. That is the very reason for a 
separate instruction in JIFU whereby the jury is cautioned not to 
give exemplary damages. Even in those cases where punitive 
damages are permitted, the jury should be cautioned about the 
limitations thereon. See Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), and the line of cases cited therein. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED ON THE RECORD 
REGARDING IMPROPER CONTACT BETWEEN THE 
PLAINTIFF AND THE JURY. 
During the course of the trial plaintiff, who was 
pregnant (R. 1452) at the time, suffered abdominal distress which 
was significant enough that she chose to absent herself from part 
of the trial. (R. 1396). Prior to leaving, she was observed to 
be in distress and to go into the restroom with certain women 
jurors. (R. 1454). The abdominal distress was significant enough 
that the plaintiff was examined on a bench just outside the 
courtroom during a recess by a physician who was present to 
testify on behalf of plaintiff. (R. 1453, 1454). 
The bailiff reported the incident to the court and 
subsequently defendant made a motion for a mistrial. (R. 1452). 
The court never actually ruled on the motion for a mistrial but 
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did comment that the bailif noticed that she was in the ladies 
restroom and that there was women jurors with her in the room, 
(R. 1454). The court then makes the statement on the record, 
"Yes, I do have that report that she was in there, there was said 
nothing out of order, no misconduct, but the women jurors were in 
the room with her." (R. 1454). 
There is nothing on the record that would justify the 
court finding that there was no misconduct since the court never 
inquired of the plaintiff, the jurors involved or of the bailiff 
concerning the matter. This is an abuse of the court's 
discretion. 
The procedure of the court should have followed to 
determine if jury misconduct occurred is set forth in several Utah 
cases. The court should have thoroughly examined the incident to 
determine what the nature of the contact was to determine whether 
the jury was tainted thereby. State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 
P. 941, (1925); State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1977); State 
v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985); and State v. Larocco, 64 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 49 (Utah 1987). 
In Anderson, a juror rode to and from the trial with a 
prosecuting witness during the course of a two-week trial. 
Affidavits of both stated they had not discussed the trial and 
that the juror had not been influenced in any way. The case was 
remanded for a new trial with the holding that: 
Any conduct or relationship between a juror 
and a party to an action during trial that 
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would or might consciously or unconsciously, 
tend to influence the judgment of the juror 
authorizes and requires the granting of a 
new trial, unless it is made to appear 
affirmatively that the judgment of the juror 
was in no way affected by such relationship 
or that the parties by their conduct waived 
their right to make objection to such 
conduct. 
Anderson, 237 P. at 942. 
In Purand, three jurors had coffee in a sheriff1s office 
on two separate occasions when deputies who were witnesses in the 
case were present. The jurors and the officers testified that 
there was no conversation about anything pertaining to the case. 
The Utah Supreme Court strongly disapproved of the conduct and 
stated that even the appearance of misconduct should be avoided. 
However, even under those circumstances it was necessary to show 
that prejudice had occurred and the court found after a thorough 
examination of the incident that no prejudice against the 
defendant resulted and therefore the criminal conviction was 
upheld. Durand, 569 P.2d at 1109. 
In Pike, the Utah Supreme Court found that a mistrial 
should have been granted explaining that, "Anything more than the 
most incidental contact during the trial between witnesses and 
jurors cast a doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at best 
gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality." Pike, 712 
P. 2d at 279-80. The court went on to state that Utah has adopted 
a very strict rule that, "Prejudice may well exist even though it 
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may 
not, himself, be able to recognize the fact." Id. at 280. The 
court found that any improper contact "which goes beyond a mere 
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incidental, unintended, and brief contact" raises the presumption 
of prejudice, id. In that case the improper contact was a 
conversation between a witness who was the arresting officer and a 
juror which the court held created "a sense of familiarity" which 
could affect the credibility of that witness with the juror. Id. 
The fact that the juror denied prejudice or influence was 
insufficient to overcome the presumption since there was no 
question about the familiarity that was produced as a result of 
the conversation. 
In Larocco, the conversation was with a juror and a 
witness who was not the main witness in the case. It was also 
significant that the testimony of that witness was uncontroverted 
and so his credibility was not at issue and any familiarity was 
not prejudicial. It is significant that the procedure followed by 
the trial judge enabled the court to make such a finding. The 
court held that after the trial judge listened to the testimony 
and arguments regarding possible prejudice that the court could 
reasonably determine that the state had sustained its burden of 
demonstrating that no prejudice resulted from the contact. 
The fact that all of these cases involved criminal 
convictions, should not alter the basic fact that a fair trial 
requires an impartial jury. There is not one standard for 
impartiality for criminal cases and a separate standard for civil 
cases. 
It should be noted that in each of these cases the burden 
was upon the prosecution to show on the record that no prejudice 
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resulted from the contact with the juror. This is because in each 
case it was a prosecution witness who had contact with jurors. In 
this case it was the plaintiff who was in the restroom with 
members of the jury. 
The court should have initiated the inquiry on the 
subject upon learning of the incident in the restroom from the 
bailiff. This would have allowed the court to determine on the 
record what transpired in the restroom. It should have been 
relatively simple for the court to inquire on the record of the 
plaintiff and the jurors what was said by the parties and what 
exactly transpired. Since the court did not do this, there is no 
way for the court to make any finding that there was no misconduct 
involved. 
It cannot be said that the defendants have waived their 
right to raise this issue on appeal since at the time defendants 
made a motion for a mistrial and the court was made aware of 
defendants1 claim. This placed upon the court the responsibility 
to make the necessary inquiry and its failure to do so constituted 
prejudicial error. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND APPEARS TO 
HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
It is conceded that the traditional general rule 
regarding the amount of jury verdicts recognizes that the 
determination of unliquidated damages involves a question of fact 
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which is solely for the jury, or the trial court which passes 
upon the jury verdict, so that an appellate court has very little 
authority to review the adequacy of the damage award. The modern 
trend of cases illustrate a very important exception to the 
general rule. This is set forth in Section 1(e) of 12 A.L.R.4th 
96 at p. 107 as follows: 
This original position has, for all 
practical purposes, been abandoned by most 
appellate courts which now rather freely 
review and adjust damage awards. This does 
not mean, however, that great weight will 
not be given to the determination of the 
jury and trial court and while a review of 
damage awards may not be had merely because 
an award might appear either liberal or 
merger, a court may interfere with a verdict 
where it appears from the evidence that the 
amount bears no reasonable relationship to 
the loss to be compensated for, or where it 
is obvious that the amount of damages 
awarded by the jury was highly conjectural 
or imaginative. 
See footnote 31 which cites the case of Dagnello v. Long Island R. 
Co., 289 F.2d 797 (2nd Cir. 1961), in which the court stated in 
a very exhaustive opinion that the courts of appellate 
jurisdiction in 47 states have power to pass upon the issue of 
damages and the Courts of Appeal of the First, Third, Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and the District of Columbia 
Circuits, have recognized their power to reverse a judgment even 
though the basis for review is the inadequacy or excessiveness of 
the verdict. 
This rationale was followed in two New Mexico cases. The 
first is somewhat analogous to the present case. In Gonzales v. 
General Motors Corp., 553 P.2d 1281 (N.M. 1976), Gonzales brought 
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a products liability action against GMC claiming that he suffered 
personal injuries as a consequence of a defective automobile. The 
injuries consisted of extensive burns with resulting scarring. He 
was hospitalized on two occasions for a total of 54 days. He 
appeared to have made a fairly good recovery with residual 
problems related to the scarring both from a functional and 
cosmetic standpoint. He also testified that he suffered from 
depression and that testimony was supported by his wife's 
observations. The medical expenses and lost wages were 
approximately $8,200. The jury verdict was approximately $275,000 
with $260,000 being for general damages. 
Defendants made a motion for a new trial claiming that 
the verdict was excessive and was the result of prejudice or 
passion. In support of that argument, defendants claimed, for the 
first time, that plaintiff's counsel made an improper closing 
argument in that it contained inflammatory statements. The 
offensive argument was a reference to the fact that in plaintiff's 
mind he was handicapped for life and that he had suffered brain 
damage. No objection was made to this argument at the time nor 
was the jury admonished to disregard the same by the trial court. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the record, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court held that the damages were excessive and reduced 
them by the amount of $200,000 and directed the parties to either 
settle for approximately $75,000 or the case would be remanded for 
a new trial. 
The case is analogous to the present case in that the 
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appellate court recognized its responsible to reduce excessive 
verdicts based upon prejudice or sympathy. In the instant case, 
plaintiff's unwarranted seeking of exemplary damages and the 
possible irregularity of the jury in its contact with plaintiff in 
the restroom adequately demonstrates that the verdict is suspect 
and may well be the product of sympathy, prejudice and passion. 
In the second New Mexico case of Regenold v. Rutherford, 
679 P.2d 833 (N.M.App. 1984), Regenold was injured in an 
automobile accident with the defendant and brought an action for 
compensatory as well as punitive damages. Defendant had been 
drinking and he admitted liability for the accident in an attempt 
to keep his culpable conduct from the jury. The trial court 
allowed testimony of this type to be submitted to the jury on the 
issue of punitive damages. At the conclusion of the evidence the 
trial court ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to submit 
the punitive damage question to the jury and so advised the jury 
that the punitive damage claim had been dismissed. 
However, defendant made no request for a cautionary 
instruction on damages whereby the jury would have been instructed 
that it could not award punitive damages. The jury awarded 
compensatory damages of $47,500 based upon plaintiff's injuries 
which consisted of a compression fracture of the L3 vertebrae; the 
broken portion of the vertebrae did not heal by the time of trial 
and was not expected to heal in the future. There was also a 
narrowing of the disc space with some evidence of herniation of 
the disc. There was testimony that the condition would degenerate 
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in the future. Plaintiff continued to suffer from low back pain 
which was expected to continue in the future. The court rejected 
defendant's claim that the award was excessive. 
Had the trial judge in the instant case followed this 
procedure, the jury would have been advised that it could not 
award exemplary damages. In Regenold, the jury was advised that 
the punitive damage claim had been dismissed so that the court had 
a basis for finding that the jury did not consider punitive 
damages in assessing its award. However, in the instant case, the 
jury was left without any instruction or admonishment on the 
subject by the trial judge's refusal to so inform the jury. This 
failure affected a substantial right of the defendants and it was 
therefore prejudicial error for the court to refuse to give the 
requested instruction. 
The case is cited herein because it illustrates the 
handling of the punitive damage question. The court rejected the 
notion of defense counsel that the jury was influenced by 
prejudice or passion, because the jury was properly advised that 
the punitive damage claim had been dismissed. The appeals court 
then inferred that had counsel asked for a cautionary instruction 
on the punitive damage issue, it would have been given by the 
court. Id. at 836. Nevertheless, the appeals court held that the 
verdict was not excessive under the circumstances and that there 
was no showing of prejudice or passion on the part of the jury. 
It is also important for the proposition that the appeals court 
was the proper forum for reviewing the adequacy of the jury 
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verdict. 
Defendants acknowledge that each case must be reviewed on 
its own merits and that there is no formula by which the court can 
determine the adequacy of a verdict. However, there must be some 
reasonable relationship between general damages and special 
damages. See 6 Am.Jur. Trials 963, Predicting the Verdict §24 and 
Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 403 N.E.2d 402 (1980 Mass) 
(holding that the disproportion between special damages and 
general damages is a proper factor for the court to take into 
account in deciding whether excessive damages have been awarded). 
The problem with the present case is that the jury verdict has 
been tainted by plaintiff's improper testimony and the improper 
argument of her counsel on the issue of exemplary damages. Thus, 
it is impossible to know what influence this prejudice had on the 
verdict. 
It is acknowledged that Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence states that an error must be predicated upon a ruling 
which affects a substantial right of a party. Defendants maintain 
that the errors set forth above were singularly prejudicial and 
the cumulative effect thereof denied defendants the right to a 
fair trial. The last thing that the jury heard from either of the 
parties was plaintiff's inflammatory closing argument in which her 
counsel referred to the "candles of justice" in Utah County and 
called upon the jury to recognize the importance of this case by 
making an example of the defendants. This was an obvious attempt 
to inflame the jury and the resulting verdict of $150,000 which 
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was nearly 12 times the amount of specials claimed in plaintiff's 
closing argument. (R. 1688, 1689). 
It is not the intent of defendants to herein reargue the 
nature of the injuries suffered by plaintiff or to suggest a 
particular formula that the jury should have followed in assessing 
damages. It is defendants' position that the irregularity set 
forth above casts a cloud of doubt upon the fairness of the trial 
and the resulting jury verdict. Thus, defendants are entitled to 
have the matter remanded for a new trial free of the taint of the 
irregularities and misconduct set forth above. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to 
grant defendants' motion for a new trial. Defendants were 
entitled to a new trial because the trial court committed 
prejudicial error which affected the substantial rights of the 
defendants and denied them a fair trial in the following 
particulars: 
1. By failing to strike plaintiff's testimony requesting 
exemplary damages and in failing to admonish the jury to disregard 
the same. 
2. By failing to strike plaintiff's offensive rebuttal 
argument requesting exemplary damages and in failing to admonish 
the jury to disregard the same. 
3. By failing to give defendants' requested cautionary 
instruction on damages whereby the jury would have been told not 
to award any damages for the purpose of making an example of the 
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defendants• 
4. In failing to determine if improper contact was had 
between the plaintiff and members of the jury during the course of 
the trial. 
5. By failing to rule that the verdict of the jury was 
excessive in that it was given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice or as a consequence of improper conduct on the part of 
plaintiff and her attorney. 
Defendants respectfully request that the court set aside 
the ver&T&t #nd judgment entered thereon and remand the case to 
the district court for a new trial on all of the issues. 
Dated this /J day of December, 1987. 
IVIE 
Henry E. vHeaMi 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicted upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent 
from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add 
any other or further statement which shows the 
character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. 
It may direct the making of an offer in question and 
answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall 
be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent 
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any 
means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking 
questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they 
were not brought to the attention of the court. 
RULE 59 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
NEW TRIALS 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all 
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and 
direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the procedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or 
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to 
any general or special verdict, or to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, 
such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of 
any one of the jurors. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
APPENDIX B 
This is a sample of the number of times the trial court 
interrupted plaintiff's counsel without solicitation of defense 
counsel (either by way of objection or motion to strike) for the 
purpose of ruling upon the admissibility of evidence and 
admonishing plaintiff's counsel regarding the form of certain 
questions. This is illustrated by showing the page number on 
which the court made the unsolicited rulings against plaintiff's 
counsel and includes only the plaintiff's case in chief. It does 
not involve any cross-examination of defense witnesses and is 
submitted only as a sample of this practice and for the purpose of 
illustrating the perception the trial judge had that it was 
necessary to control the manner of plaintiff's presentation of the 
evidence in order to insure a fair trial. 
NAME OF WITNESS EXAMINATION BY 
MR. HARDING 
PAGE NUMBERS ON 
WHICH COURT 
INTERRUPTED HARDING 
Wendy Lee Steck R. 719 to 746 R. 725, 726, 
727, 728, 729, 
730, 731, 732, 
733, 734, 735, 
736, 737, 738, 
739, 741, 742, 
743, 746 
Tracy Twitchell R. 751 to 763 R. 754, 755, 7558 
759, 761, 762, 
763 
















































Dr. Devon Nelson R. 1004 to 1056 
R. 1091 to 1097 
R. 1010, 1011, 1012 
1013, 1014, 1018, 
1020, 1021, 1023, 
1038, 1052, 1053, 
1055, 1093, 1095 
Appendix B 
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NAME OF WITNESS EXAMINATION BY 
MR. HARDING 




Jeffrey L. Matthews 
Charles Hugo 
R. 1099 to 1113 
R. 1127 to 1155 
R. 1163 to 1165 
R. 1168 to 1208 
R. 1229 to 1231 
R. 1233 to 1259 
R. 1252 to 1269 





















R. 1187, 1208 
R. 1235, 1236, 1246, 
1247, 1249, 1254, 
1255, 1257, 1258, 
1265, 1266, 1267, 
1268 
Mark Fulton R. 1271 to 1295 
R. 1297 to 1298 
1287, 1289, 1293 
Karen Fulton 
Lynn A. Anderson 
R. 1298 to 1309 
R. 1324 to 1333 
R. 1336 
R. 1298, 1299, 1303, 
1305, 1306, 1307, 
1308, 1309 
R. 1330, 1331 












Lynn M. Gaufin R. 1375 to 1420 
R. 1437 to 1442 
R. 1398, 1418, 1440 
Total pages of direct examination 
by Mr. Harding during case 
in chief: 466 
Total pages on which there is at least 
one unsolicited ruling or admonishment 
by the court: 14 3 
